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The proposed revision of the criminal code for Kentucky attempts
to deal with the myriad problems of theft'-an attempt in accord
with other jurisdictions which are troubled with the same difficulties
perplexing the Commonwealth. 2 This paper will examine the common
law and statutory law of theft in Kentucky, the proposed code, and
the effects it will have on the operating system.
Kentucky is not the first state to attempt revision of its criminal law
of theft. Similar efforts have been made in California, New York,
Massachusetts, Wisconsin and other jurisdictions, often in conjunction
with a general revision of the criminal code of the state.
At common law, larceny was defined as the wrongful taking and
removing of the personal property of another by trespass by any
person with a felonious intent to permanently deprive him of his
property without his consent.3 Many states, including Kentucky, in-
corporated the common law of larceny into their statutes without
further definition. The requirement of a trespass left theft by a servant,
although of equal moral turpitude, outside the statute. Specifically, a
thief who gained possession of property with the permission of the
owner could not be guilty of larceny if he formed the intent to steal it
after receiving the property. Thus, theft by a servant was covered by
a stop-gap statute; the offense has come to be known as embezzlement.4
The sole distinguishing feature between the offenses of larceny and
embezzlement was whether the thief gained initial possession of the
goods by trespass.
A further twist was added where a thief, by misrepresentation,
defrauded a victim who gave the thief not only possession, but also
title to the property. This was not larceny, where the thief obtained
only possession, nor was it embezzlement, where the thief acquired the
property rightfully. As a result, a new crime arose by statute-theft by
false pretenses.
ISee 1 J. BIsHoP, CnnNAL LAw (9th ed. J. Zane & C. Zollmann 1923) [here-
inafter cited as Bisnop]; J. HALL, THEFr, LAw AN SoCiETY (2d ed. 1952); J.
MAY, LAw OF Canmss (4th ed. K. Sears & H. Weihofen 1988).
2 There have been two summaries of the Kentucky law of theft. See J. GREG-
ORY, Kmrucxy CRInMNAL L.¢w PnOcEuRE AND FoMS (1918) [hereinafter cited
as GREGORY]; T. ROBaSON, KENTUCKY CnmN~r. LAw AND PROcEDURE (2d ed.
1927) [hereinafter cited as ROBRSON].3 Alexander v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 290, 20 S.W. 254 (1892).
4 1 BisHoP § 567.
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ii. THm Cvmuw LAw
A. Larceny
Kentucky Revised Statute [hereinafter referred to as KRS] §
433.220 provides in part:
Any person guilty of larceny of . . . property of the value of one
hundred dollars or more shall be confined in the penitentiary for not
less than one nor more than five years.5
As the Kentucky statute does not define larceny, it is interpreted in
terms of the common law: 6 the unlawful taking and carrying away
the goods or property of another, with the felonious intent to ap-
propriate them permanently to the use of the trespasser7
The act of taking and carrying away requires some movement from
the place the object occupies,8 by trespass,9 but does not necessitate
the actual removal of the property from the owner's premises. Larceny
is not complete until the thief acquires such dominion over the
property as to enable him to take control of it.'0 It appears that the
property must be taken only from the constructive possession of the
owner, as an indictment may properly describe either the true owner
or an agent or bailee."1
The original limitation of the subject matter of larceny was
personal property which was of at least slight value12 and which
might be taken or carried away.'8 Larceny in Kentucky has been en-
larged by statute to include bonds, deeds, wills, bills obligatory and
other paper14 which at common law were mere evidences of debt
and not the subject matter of larceny. 15
Real property has been excluded, as a rule. This exception has re-
sulted in the following distinction:
It is not larceny to take and carry away grass, crops, fruit, trees, fix-
tures, coal, ores, etc., where the property taken was a part of the realty,
5 In addition to Ky. Ev. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 433.220 (1962),
there are several larcenies which relate to special property. See KRS Chapter 433;
GREcoRY §§ 333-50. Petit larceny is covered by KRS § 433.230 (1962).
6Wombles v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1958).
7 Triplett v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 974, 91 S.W. 281 (1906); see
also 1 BISHOP § 566.8 Wombles v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1958).
9 Alexander v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 290, 20 S.W. 254 (1892).
10Adams v. Commonwealth, 153 Ky. 88, 154 S.W.381 (1913).
11Thomas v. Commonwealth, 1 Ky. L. Rptr. 407 (1880). See RoBERsoN §
813.
12 For the difficulties in determining value, see Allen v. Commonwealth, 148
Ky. 327, 146 S.W. 762 (1912).
3. Eaton v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 466, 31 S.W.2d 718 (1930).
14 KRS § 433.170 (1962).
5 RoBERSoQN § 810,
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and the severance and carrying away were parts of the same continuous
transaction, so that there was no time between the severance and the
carrying away for the property to lose its character as real property,
and become personal.16
The larceny is not complete unless the accused takes the property
without the consent of the owner,17 and with the intent to permanently
deprive the owner of his property.' In the absence of this intent
there is no larceny:
To take property in the absence of an intent to steal, that is, an
intention to convert the same to the use of the taker and permanently
deprive the owner thereof, is not larceny, though under proper condi-
tions it may constitute trespass. 19
Felonious intent is an essential element and must exist at the time of
the taking.20 So where one takes under a bona fide belief that he has
a right to the property, although his ignorance of the law does not
relieve him, his lack of felonious intent bars conviction for larceny.21
And, further, where one takes property with an intent not to
permanently deprive the owner, but to return or replace it, there is
no larceny. If a man hires a horse in good faith with the intention of
returning it and is arrested on the owner's charge of theft before he
has a chance to return it, he is not guilty of larceny.22 Similarly,
larceny does not include short joy rides in stolen cars or a "borrowing"
of property.23 The permanency requirement may allow a valid defense
for the accused:
While it is a defense to a charge of stealing that the prisoner pawned
or pledged the property with the intention of redeeming it, it is not a
defense to be encouraged, yet if dearly made out in proof, it should
prevail; but to make the defense available, there must not only be the
intent, but the ability, to redeem.
24
10 Id. at § 808. Appropriately enough, the Kentucky Court has held that
moonshine whiskey may be the subiect of larceny. Commonwealth v. Collins, 291
Ky. 685, 165 S.W.2d 357 (1942); Ray v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 656, 20
S.W.2d 484 (1929).
17 Hudspeth v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 4, 7, 241 S.W. 71, 73 (1922).
18 Brennon v. Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 815, 185 S.W. 489 (1916).
19 Ford v. Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 126, 130, 193 S.W. 1026, 1028 (1917).2 0 Cooper v. Commonwealth. 110 Ky. 123, 60 S.W. 938 (1901).
2 1 Triplett v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 974, 91 S.W. 281 (1906).
See GREGORY § 322.
22 Smith v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 433, 112 S.W. 615 (1908).23 Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 96, 89 S.W. 160 (1905).
KRS § 434.040 (1962) "was designed to cover a special situation in the handling
of motor vehicles which should be treated as larceny." Dublin v. Commonwealth,
372 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Ky. 1963). Although a separate crime, this may also be
prosecuted under a general larceny statute. Clark v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 184,
272 S.W. 430 (1925).2 4 RoBEasoN § 819.
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B. Embezzlement
An essential element of larceny was a trespass. But theft by a
servant who had obtained the property without trespass was of equal
moral turpitude. In efforts to include such theft within the scope of
common law larceny, the courts went so far as to say that a servant
was guilty of larceny if he had the felonious intent when he gained
possession of the property.25 But where the servant took the property
in the regular course of his services and thereafter formed the intent
to steal it and did so, there was no larceny. In the face of this in-
creasingly common situation, the statutory offense of embezzlement was
established to fill the gap.
26
Kentucky has two key embezzlement statutes; 27 KRS § 434.101
provides:
Any officer, agent or employee of any corporation who embezzles or
fraudulently converts to his own use or the use of another bullion, money,
bank notes, or any other property belonging to the corporation or any
person, which has come to his possession or has been placed in his care
or under his management as officer, agent or employee, and the person
to whose use the bullion, money, bank notes or other property were
fraudulently converted if he assented to the embezzlement or conversion,
shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more
than ten years.
The elements of this offense are that the money or property in question
belonged to a corporation; 28 that it was lawfully in the possession of
the accused by virtue of his office or employment; 29 and that he con-
verted it with the fraudulent intent to deprive the owner of his
property.30 KRS § 434.220 is not limited to theft from corporations, and
provides, in part:
"Any person who sells, disposes of or converts to his own use or the use
of another, any money, property or other thing of value without the
consent of the owner, shall . . . be imprisoned .1. "31
25 Id. at § 898.
26 1 BiSHoP § 567.
27 For an in-depth study of embezzlement in Kentucky, see ROBERsON §§
897-935.28 Runyan v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 689, 286 S.W. 1076 (1926). Kentucky
has held that a partner cannot be guilty of embezzling partnership funds, "since
the requirement that the property taken shall be that of another means that
'wholly of another,' and partnership funds are not 'wholly of another,'. Pierce
v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 465, 276 S.W. 185 (1925).2 9 ROBESON §§ 906-07. The specified relations are strictly upheld under the
statute, and debtor-creditor relationships do not fall within the statute. Napier
v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 724, 29 S.W.2d 24 (1930); Commonwealth v. Abele,
160 Ky. 800, 170 S.W. 191 (1914).30 Fortney v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 659, 162 S.W.2d 193 (1942).
3
1 KRS § 434.030 (1893) provides penalties for the embezzlement of property
(Continued on next page)
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute:
This section embraces all cases of fraudulent conversion of funds
belonging to individuals by agents, employees or persons acting in a
fiducial capacity which were formerly denominated breaches of trust
and not indictable under other embezzlement statutes.3 2
The accused must be lawfully in possession of the property, be-
cause, as has been seen before, if the "thief obtained the money by
trespass, then the offense would fall under the larceny statute.33 The
property must have come into his possession by virtue of his agency:
While larceny and embezzlement are generally regarded as separate and
distinct offenses, Morgan v. Com., 242 Ky. 713, 47 S.W.2d 543, yet the
two crimes frequently overlap. In attempting to determine whether a
particular crime was larceny or embezzlement, the courts have made
subtle distinctions between lawful possession and custody, but in view
of the comprehensive provisions of our statute such distinctions are
inapplicable.34
KRS § 434.220 "should be construed to include only the misap-
propriation of funds or property held in a fiduciary capacity." 5 This
interpretation by the Kentucky Court of Appeals destroys the pos-
sibility that the broad language of the statute would include the
conversion of money paid, or property conveyed by mistake, which is
no other offense and apparently, after Barney v. Commonwealth,36 is
not embezzlement either.
Criminal intent is a necessary element under any embezzlement
statute37 and must generally be determined from the acts of the
accused and the circumstances surrounding the case.38 Possible de-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
entrusted to persons for delivery. The statute embraces carriers who are guilty of
fraudulent secreting or converting of property entusted to them for delivery or
carriage. Warmoth v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 133 (1883). There are other
specific embezzlement statutes applying to public officials and those with fiduciary
duties. See ROBERSON §§ 915-18.32 Runyan v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 689, 692, 286 S.W. 1076, 1077 (1926).
See also Commonwealth v. Barney, 115 Ky. 475, 74 S.W. 181 (1903).
33 Unless a person has the intent to steal property at the time he is given
possession, he cannot be guilty of larceny. Fugate v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 815,
215 S.W.2d 1004 (1949).
34 McGlothen v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 48, 51 219 S.W.2d 1003, 1005
(1949). But see Clark v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1965). For a
revealing insight into the difficulties the Kentucky Court has faced, see the rule
as discussed in the earlier case of Warmoth v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 133 (1883).3 5 See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 125 Ky. 245, 250, 101 S.W. 315, 316 (1907).
36 115 Ky. 475, 74 S.W. 181 (1903). See Cooper v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky.
123, 60 S.W. 938 (1901), which held that one who received an overpayment by
mistake is not guilty of larceny unless he knew of the overpayment at the time
it was made and then intended to convert the extra money.3 7 See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 867, 226 S.W.2d 29 (1950);




fenses to a charge of embezzlement would be that the money was
lost;39 that the accused had a bona fide belief that he had a right to
hold the property;40 and that the money was paid by mistake;41 but
not that the accused intended to return the money later.42
C. False Pretenses
KRS § 434.050 provides, in part:
Any person who, by any false pretense, statement or token, with intent
to commit a fraud, obtains from another money, property or other thing
which may be the subject of larceny, or who obtains by any false
pretense, statement or token, with like intention, the signature of another
to a writing, the false making of which would be forgery, shall be
confined....
Generally, a false pretense is a misrepresentation of fact by a person
who knows the fact to be untrue and who makes it to induce the
victim to part with title to his property.4 3 To constitute the crime of
obtaining money or property by false pretenses, the following have
been held necessary by the Kentucky Court of Appeals:
(1) a false pretense; (2) the false pretense must be made by the de-
fendant, or by someone, whom he has induced to make it; (3) the de-
fendant must have had knowledge of the falsity of the statement, token
or pretense when he made it; (4) the person defrauded must have
relied upon the pretense and been induced thereby to part with his
property or money; (5) the property or money must have been
obtained by the defendant or by someone in his behalf; (6) the de-
fendant must have had an intent to defraud; (7) and lastly, an actual
defrauding must have resulted.44
A short summary of these elements will show that this offense is
technical and of narrow coverage.
The false pretense by which the property is obtained need not be
some symbol or token45 and may be only "a representation of some-
thing as fact, calculated to mislead, which is false to the knowledge of
the pretending party."46 It need not even be expressed in words and is
sufficient if communicated through an act by implication. 47 It need
39 Clime v. Commonwealth, 161 Ky. 678, 171 S.W. 412 (1914).
40 Comnelhv. Shilladay, 811 Ky. 478, 224 S.W.2d 685 (1949); Wester-
field v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 264 Ky. 448, 94 S.W.2d 986 (1936).
41 Cooper v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 128, 60 S.W. 938 (1901).4 2 Morrow v. Commonwealth, 157 Ky. 486, 163 S.W. 452 (1914).
4 3 RoBEasoN § 938; GREGORY § 376.
44Rand v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 343, 346, 195 S.W. 802, 805 (1917);
see Taylor v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1964); Rowland v. Common-
wealth, 355 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1962).
45 1 BisHoP § 571.
46 Id.
47 Commonwealth v. Harper, 195 Ky. 843, 243 S.W. 1053 (1922).
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not be made by the defendant himself and is sufficient "if it be done
by some one instigated by him to do so."48
The victim must have relinquished title to the property in reliance
on the statement or pretense which the defendant believed to be false
when he made it. If the representation is not false, or if the victim
knows that it is false, or if the victim does not rely on the mis-
representation, then there is no offense of false pretenses. 49 Further,
the deception need not be of the standard necessary to deceive persons
of ordinary intelligence. The Kentucky rule is that the deception
need only be calculated to deceive the person defrauded,50 as the
purpose of the law is not only to protect the average man, but also to
protect the weak from the strong.51
The subject matter of the first portion of the Kentucky false pre-
tenses statute is expressly limited to the subject matter of larceny
which has already been considered. The rightful owner must have
parted with something of some value,52 although the value of the
property obtained is said to be immaterial. 53 Similarly, the value or
purpose of an instrument is said to be immaterial under the second
portion of the statute, where the offense is the securing of a signature
on an instrument when the false making of it would have been
forgery.54 Finally, the title to the property must be secured by the
fraudulent device and not just its possession for the offense of false
pretenses.55
In a case of false pretenses, there must be an intent on the part
of the defendant to defraud the victim. 56 An intent to return the
property will not relieve one from criminal liability for false pre-
tenses. 7 Further, the false pretense must have been material to the
48 Commonwealth v. Harper, 195 Ky. 843, 847, 243 S.W. 1053, 1055 (1922);
see Commonwealth v. Boyd, 181 Ky. 382, 205 S.W. 390 (1918).
49Rand v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 343, 195 S.W. 802 (1917); Common-
wealth v. Beckett, 119 Ky. 817, 84 S.W. 758 (1905). In Day v. Commonwealth,
33 KT. L. Rptr. 560, 110 S.W. 417 (1908), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held:
[N]o principle is better settled than that the deception must be upon a
material point its falsity known to the maker, made for the purpose of
deceiving, anc must, in fact, be relied upon by and deceive the party to
whom it is made to his prejudice. Id. at 419.
50Finney v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 536, 227 S.W. 999 (1921). See ROB-
EasoN § 940.5 1 See McDowell v. Commonwealth, 136 Ky. 8, 123 S.W. 313 (1909).52 RoBapsoN § 954.
53 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 1, 4 S.W. 685 (1887).
54 Commonwealth v. Lacey, 158 Ky. 584, 165 S.W. 971 (1914). See Gmc-
oaRY § 379; RoBEnsoN § 996.
55 Commonwealth v. Schang, 131 Ky. 405, 115 S.W. 218 (1909). See Gaso-
oary § 382; ROBERSON § 958.56But see Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 135 Ky. 32, 121 S.W. 967 (1909),
which held that it is immaterial whether the victim actually or ultimately suffers
a loss.
57 Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 92 Ky. 510, 18 S.W. 775 (1892).
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defrauding of the victim. 8 This is sufficient even if the false repre-
sentations were not made to the owner of the property. 9
Where there is no false representation, there is clearly no offense
under this section,60 but where one does exist, the misrepresentation
must concern the existence of a past or existing fact.0 1 A false statement
concerning a future act is said to put one on guard due to the un-
certainty of future events. 62 Therefore, a false pretense concerning a
future event is insufficient to constitute an offenseY3 The exception is
where it is coupled with a false statement concerning a past or exist-
ing fact which induces another to rely upon the false promise. This
is within the statute.6 4
The uttering of a worthless check which the drawer knows will
not be paid is "a degree of the offense of obtaining money by false
pretenses."65 However, a cold check is covered by a separate statute,
KRS § 484.070, under which it is not necessary to show that a false
pretense was made, which, as has been seen, is a requirement under
KRS § 434.050.66
Finally, a distinction is drawn between a false pretense and a
statement of opinion. A statement merely expressing the opinion of
the maker as to the value or suitability of a location are considered
"dealer's talk" and do not come under this section. This distinction is
made between superlatives of praise and statements of fact.
67
III. APPOAcGEs TO A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
The technical distinctions in the law of theft are the result of
historical development. Presently, the courts are required to labor
through these distinctions in case after case in a time consuming effort
to dispense justice under present law in Kentucky.68 A quote from a
68 Sweeton v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 340, 275 S.W. 827 (1925). For a
discussion of materiality of fraud to a false pretense, see ROBERSON § 938.
59 Commonwealth v. Johnson 167 Ky. 727, 181 S.W. 368 (1916).
60 Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 242, 147 S.W. 881 (1912).
61 Commonwealth v. Harper, 195 Ky. 843, 243 S.W. 1053 (1922).
62 GREGoRy § 378.
63 See Day v. Commonwealth, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 560, 110 S.W. 417 (1908).
64 Commonwealth v. Tidwell, 162 Ky. 114, 172 S.W. 102 (1915); McDowell
v. Commonwealth, 136 Ky. 8, 123 S.W. 313 (1909); Commonwealth v. Murphy,
96 Ky. 28, 27 S.W. 859 (1894).65 Daily v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Ky. 1952).
66 Commonwealth v. McCall, 186 Ky. 301, 217 S.W. 109 (1919). See ROB-
ERSON §§ 975-78.67 See ROBERSON §§ 960, 972.
68 See Note, Pleading Under the Consolidated Larceny Statute, 9 FLA. L. BEv.
209 (1956):
By clever manipulation of pleading technicalities, defendants were af-
forded an almost unlimited opportunity to escape or postpone their just
(Continued on next page)
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recent decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals illustrates this often
over-looked fault in the statutes:
Appellant next contends that she was improperly tried under KRS
434.010 [embezzlement by officer, agent or employee of corporation],
but should have been tried under KRS 434.050 [false pretenses] or under
KRS 433.170 [larceny]. Appellant argues that she did not have possession
of the checks or proceeds but only mere custody, and if she did have
possession of the checks or proceeds, the possession was not lawfully
acquired as required for a conviction under KRS 434.010 ....
Appellant's contention is that an agent or employee of a corporation
cannot be guilty of embezzlement of his principal's property if he has
formed the intent to appropriate it before it comes into his possession.
This contention was expressly rejected .... 69
These problems have been recognized in a number of jurisdictions
and accordingly have been the subject of diverse remedies. 70 Primarily
two approaches have been taken, one procedural and the other sub-
stantive.
The joinder procedure has been a common device.7' The Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure allow joinder of two or more offenses
in the same indictment "if the offenses are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same acts or transactions connected
together ... "7 2 and allow two or more indictments to be tried together
if the offenses "could have been joined in a single indictment or in-
formation."73 Although this procedure allows the prosecutor to allege
larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses, and to proceed to trial on
that basis, the burden of deciding which of the three (or more) of-
fenses the accused did commit, if any, is merely shifted to the jury.7
This cover does not alleviate the problem but creates lengthy,
complex indictments75 and a general circumventing of the criminal
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
punishment. Recognizing this, the legislatures of several states enacted
statutes combining larceny, obtaining property by false pretenses and
embezzlement into one crime, termed-'theft' in some states and 'larceny'
in others. The purpose of these statutes is to simplify pleading. Most of
them provide language of a general nature as a legally sufficient charge
for any one of the three crimes. Id. at 210.69 Brundage v. Commonwealth, 416 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Ky. 1967).
70 Peterson, Needed-A Consolidated Theft Statute in Georgia, 23 GA. B. J.
461 (1961); Scurlock, The Element of Trespass in Larceny Under the Statutes
[hereinafter cited as Scurlock] 22 TEmp. L.Q. 253 (1959); Stumberg, Criminal
Appropriation of Movables-A Need for Legislative Reform, 19 TEXAS L. RV.
117, 300 (1941).
71 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Information § 161 (1944).
72 Ky. R. Crma. P. 6.18.
73 Ky. R. Crum. P. 9.12. See Roark v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 539, 290 S.W.
314 (1927).
74 Scurlock 255-58. Larceny and embezzlement were early held to be distinct
offenses which had to be set out in sufficient terms as to indicate which was being
charged. Commonwealth v. Clifford, 96 Ky. 4, 27 S.W. 811 (1894).7 5 Scurlock 258.
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procedure. The only effective manner of handling the problem is
through proper legislation by the state legislature effecting a sub-
stantive change in the statutes.
When conversion through breach of trust and false pretenses
arose to challenge the scope of the crime of larceny, they were
judicially declared not to be within its scope. This decision, which
required additional statutes specifying these acts as criminal conduct,
has been recognized as an unfortunate decision and the cause of cur-
rent problems. 8 That historical decision may be counteracted today
by the state legislature in enlarging the scope of the crime of larceny.
However, the repeated construing of the word "larceny" through the
years prevents the use of this established term. Rather, the term
"theft," which has been described by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
as wider than larceny,77 is the more appropriate term for a statute
which combines the historic crimes of larceny, embezzlement and false
pretenses.
Insight into the necessity for such statutory change is not unique
to Kentucky. Many other states have enacted legislation to handle the
theft problems passed to them by the English common law.78 Two
general types of statutes have been passed and several judicial inter-
pretations have been handed down, some unfavorable. Statutes were
passed in some jurisdictions providing that those who obtained
property by embezzlement or false pretenses were "guilty of larceny. 79
Similar statutes were construed in a variety of ways by different courts,
often defeating their intended purpose.80 It is significant to note that
this procedure retained the old forms of the crimes. The only change
is that there is, in effect, an incorporation of the three offenses under
one heading, "larceny."
The beauty of such a method is the certainty of the criminal law
after its adoption, because the constitutent crimes remain in the same
common law language obviating consideration of the meaning and
extent of new terminology. The efficacy of the statute must depend
upon the legislature making its meaning clear and the courts con-
struing the statute accordingly. The effectiveness of these statutes
has depended on the interpretation given them by the courts.
76 1 BIsHoP § 567.
7TMcKenzie v. Travelers' Fire Ins. Co., 239 Ky. 227, 39 S.W.2d 239 (1931).
78 The list includes Wisconsin, New York, Indiana, California, Louisiana,
Kansas, Virginia, Florida, North Carolina and Massachusetts.
79 Virginia and West Virginia use language of this type. It follows the rationale
of several statutes of similar effect in Kansas and North Carolina.
50 State v. Burks, 159 Mo. 568, 60 S.W. 1100 (1901); see Scurlock 253.
Contra, State v. Wallace, 118 W.Va. 127, 189 S.E. 104 (1936); Pitsnogle v. Com-
monwealth, 91 Va. 808, 22 S.E. 351 (1895).
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There has continued to be an issue as to the constitutionality of the
consolidating statutes.8 ' Does the accused have the right to know of
which of the three crimes he is accused? Under the solution above, as
the crimes are still separate in form and apparently only incorporated
in effect, there is, at least, a strong argument that the accused is
entitled to know of which of the three crimes he stands accused.
A second substantive approach is the consolidation of the various
theft offenses into a complete theft statute, replacing the former
triumvirate of offenses with one crime under one statute. This, the
most radical approach, is exemplified by the Model Penal Code, and
is found under the general heading of "stealing" or "theft" with the
offense resting on key concepts such as "appropriation," "control,"
"obtaining," or "conversion."
8 2
Such a statute provides the opportunity for eliminating the dis-
tinctions between the three basic forms of theft. It is questionable
whether such statutes assure greater clarity and certainty in the law.
The effectiveness varies with the composition of statutes and their
interpretation. Most provide for a bill of particulars which enables the
accused to request and obtain a more concise statement of the crime
with which he is charged in an effort to assure the constitutionality of
the statute. But these bills are not generally required to state which
of the historic crimes constitutes the theory on which the state has
charged the accused and will proceed against him. And even if the
theory must be enumerated, there is no variance in the indictment and
the conviction if the state changes the nature of its theory from that
stated in the bill. There is a question whether such a bill will furnish
the defendant with sufficient information:
When the defendant is informed by the bill or the indictment as to the
nature of the property alleged to have been taken, the name of the
party from whom taken, the time and general circumstances, and other
such matters, he has all the significant information needed in order to
prepare his defense. If he can prove that he did not take or convert
another's property with criminal intent, he will successfully meet any
evidence that the Commonwealth may introduce under the indictment.
To require the prosecution to elect in such cases would be to continue
to afford an opportunity for the frustration of the ends of justice.83
The initial uncertainty of the meaning of such legislation will call
for judicial decision as to the meaning and scope of new terms in the
statute. Peculiar to the consolidating statutes which rewrite the law
81 Scurlock 265-69.




of theft in new terms is the danger of statutes which are too broad . 4
The subject matter and acts declared criminal may be outside the
intended scope of the statute,85 but there are certain areas in theft
which might properly be extended. One is the subject matter of theft,
which might well include real, as well as non-corporeal, 6 property.
The "severence" distinction which continues in Kentucky could be a
distinction without a difference as to culpability, if not in law.
87
Different statutes have been adopted by nearly every jurisdiction
which has attempted reform in this area. This is especially true of the
consolidating statutes. The basic pattern, and continuing reference, has
been the tentative drafts of the Model Penal Code. The key con-
cept, "control," has been accepted by the American Law Institute in-
stead of the traditional element of asportation. The older concept,
with generations of interpretation and development was a convenient
point at which to distinguish criminal from non-criminal acts. The
change has brought criticism from the leading scholar in the field of
theft, Professor Jerome Hall of Indiana University:
'Asportation' is an extremely precise test to differentiate the attempt from
the consummated crime; and although the difference between attempt and
mere preparation is not a precise one, common law formulas and case
law provide much help in determining that question . . . .The above
difficulties concerning 'control' raise serious doubts about the entire
plan of the new statutes, since that term is central in most of them.
8 8
In the same article, Professor Hall expresses concern about several
other parts of the Model Penal Code, which relate to Kentucky theft
law. Larceny in Kentucky has traditionally been divided into petit
and grand larceny, according to the value of the property stolen. The
value at which petit and grand larceny were split has been as low as
twenty dollars and presently stands at one hundred dollars.8 9 The
related offenses are not separated into degrees. In the new statutes
84 See Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers the Model Penal Code, 63 COLTJm. L. REv.
608 (1963):
While, as has been noted, some portions of the Code strive too hard for
simple, broad general principles, and cause confusion in so doing, others
confuse because of the draftsmen's too fertile and too fully-expressed
imaginations. Id. at 621.8 5 See Peterson, Needed-A Consolidated Theft Statute in Georgia, 23 GA.
B.J. 461, 477 (1961).8 6 See Hall, supra note 82, at 961.
8
7 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956) distinguishing
"movable" and "immovable property, but including both in the subject matter
of theft.
88 Hall, supra note 82, at 962.
89 The distinction between petit and grand larceny under Carroll's Ky. STATS.
§§ 1194 & 1243 (1893) was $20. Today the value of demarcation is $100 under
KRS § 433.220 (1962) and KRS § 483.230 (1962). The Proposed Kentucky
Criminal Code would set the value at $250.
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with combined offenses, the question of degrees and appropriate
pigeon-holing according to the culpabiilty of the crime involved is
a serious undertaking.90 This division into degrees is necessary in theft
statutes, but should not be incorporated into them until research and
study assure that the divisions correspond to the seriousness of the
crime. The plan incorporated into the Model Penal Code has been
criticized on several points.91 Although he is the "heart of the theft
problem," the receiver of stolen property is still treated by most codes
as a less serious criminal than, or on a par with, one who steals
property of similar value. Professor Hall expresses his concern in a
recent article:
The central role of the receiver in the field of theft is ignored when
no distinction is made between receiver and thief, and basing the gravity
of the offense of receiving on the value of the property received ignores
the fact that a junk dealer who buys stolen goods from the neighbor-
hood boys commits harm far greater than that designated by the small
value of the stolen property in the individual transaction 92
IV. IssuEs RELATED To A GNxmi.L ThEFr STATUTE
The distinctions between theft and related offenses are not the
sole problems in the criminal appropriation of property. There is an
additional issue of whether to include real and non-corporeal property
in the subject matter of theft. The intricate problems concerning the
establishment of degrees of theft and their scope, as well as those
concerning the receiver of stolen goods who continues to escape
effective punishment, have been considered. In addition, several other
problems must be resolved in any re-examination of theft.
In Kentucky, one who converts an overpayment made to him by
mistake is not guilty of larceny unless he knew of the overpayment at
the time it was made and at that time intended to convert it.93 And
similarly, conversion of lost property does not constitute larceny un-
less the converter took the property with the intention to convert it
to his own use.94 This gap is best filled with a statute which specifically
makes this conversion a "theft" just as larceny and related offenses. This
is the approach taken by the Model Penal Code which requires the
finder of lost property or the receiver of an overpayment to take
"reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to
9 0 MICHIGAN PROPOSED CRIMNAL CODE [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED MICH.
CRaM. CODE] §§ 3206-08 (Final Draft Sept. 1967).
91 Hall, supra note 82, at 961-62.
92 Id. at 963.
93 Cooper v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 123, 60 S.W. 938 (1901); For the rule
in embezzlement, see ROBERSON § 897.94 Commonwealth v. Metcalfe, 184 Ky. 540, 212 S.W. 434 (1919).
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have it."95 The drafters of the Code deemed it "unnecessary to attempt
to spell out" a definition of "reasonable measures" as a section had in
an earlier draft.96
Since embezzlement is only committed "where there is a trust or
confidence intentionally reposed by one party and voluntarily as-
sumed by the other,"97 statutes may be passed by the legislature to
cover specific relationships. KRS § 434.010 is limited to "officers,
agents, and employees," but KRS § 434.220 pertains to "any person."
Typically, the Michigan Proposed Code, in covering anyone who
"exerts unauthorized control over the property of the owner" 98 avoids
any difficulty arising from the failure of the existence of such a
relationship; "the stress on 'unauthorized contror over the property
of the 'owner' removes from consideration any issue of the specific
character of the relationship."9 9 This same stress on "control" was the
subject of criticism by Professor Hall:
at many points doubts would arise as to where non-criminal action ends
where 'control' begins, and there would be no established way to resolve
them objectively.10o
The greatest difficulty in false pretenses is that the misrepresenta-
tion must be as to a present or past event or fact. Misrepresentations
as to future acts do not come within the statute. This requirement in
Kentucky, though historically accurate, has been criticized and
abolished in several jurisdictions.
An intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property is a
requirement in larceny. However, in embezzlement and false pre-
tenses this requirement is not necessary, since the wrongful taking of
another's property is sufficient. Therefore, in larceny, an intent to
restore or return the property is a valid defense, but in embezzlement
and false pretenses, an intent to return the property is not a defense.
Legislators, in consolidating any of these offenses will have to con-
sider the effect to be given this requirement; for if the requirement is
added to embezzlement, for example, the embezzler may defend that
he had only the intent to use the property and intended to return it,
but was stopped from doing so by his apprehension for theft. It has
been noted that such an additional requirement in embezzlemenit
9 5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.5 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).9 6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). But see
PROPOSED MicH. Cium. CODE § 3215(2): "'Reasonable measures' includes but is
not necessarily limited to notifying the identified owner or any peace officer."9 T ROBERSON § 897. See also Oliver v. Commonwealth, 251 Ky. 42, 64 S.W.2d
439 (1933); Commonwealth v. Weddle, 176 Ky. 780 197 S.W. 446 (1917).
98 pOPOSED MIcH. Crum. CODE § 3205(1)(a) (1967).
99 Id. at Comment 2.
100 Hall, supra note 82, at 962.
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situations "may increase the difficulty of convicting embezzlers who,
under present rules, need not have had that intention."'101
V. CONCLUSION
An effort to revise the Kentucky theft statutes should contain a
combining statute of the kind which provides that those who com-
mit larceny, obtain by false pretenses or embezzle shall be guilty of
theft. This would solve the problem of the distinctions in the several
offenses without adding problems of further interpretations of the
language of the separate parts of the new offense. As has been
mentioned before, this could have been the law as it was handed
down through the centuries had the common law crime of larceny
been enlarged, rather than restricted. Certainly this is the way laymen
believe the law to be-without the traditional distinctions of trespass,
possession and title. The understood crime is the appropriation of the
personal property of another without his consent.
The objective of such a statute could be achieved as well through
one of the other approaches which eliminate the technicalities that
exist in pleading and proof. But this form would retain statutes and
case law foundations on which the Commonwealth presently operates
and would leave the present law, in the event of any difficulty in the
combining statute, under judicial scrutiny.
A bill of particulars should enable the accused to learn under which
of the theories the Commonwealth intends to proceed in court, but
the Commonwealth should be allowed subsequent amendment in the
event of a change in evidence at trial. It should be made clear that
this would not require an amendment of the indictment and would not
constitute a variance in the indictment and the proof. 10 2
Further, the section should make clear that the intent of the
legislature and the purpose of the statute is to combine the offenses of
larceny, embezzlement and false pretenses in order to avoid distinctions
between them. The statute should indicate specifically if it is meant
to include non-corporeal property and real property, or either, in the
subject matter of the larger crime, theft. Finally, the statute should
101 Id. at 963.
102 See Commonwealth v. Harper, 195 Ky. 843, 243 S.W. 1053 (1922). In
Braswell v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. 1960), the Court held:
Generally, a variance between the indictment and the proof is not re-
garded as material unless it misleads the accused in making his defense
or exposes him to the danger of a second conviction of the same of-
fense .... The immunity sought to be invoked is a constitutional one




clearly state whether it is intended to include misrepresentations as to
future acts.
In addition to the above statute, in-depth study should be given
the problem of effective legislation against the crime of receiving
stolen property. 03 It has been suggested that this crime should also
be combined into the general crime of theft, as it is difficult in some
cases to determine whether the accused was the actual thief or the
receiver of the stolen property.104 Effective action by the Legislature
in this field is the only significant way in which it can combat the theft
rate which comprises eighty-seven per-cent of all reported crimes. 05
These studies should also consider the proper differentiations to be
made in dividing crimes against property into degrees. Finally, an
effective analysis should be made of the desirability of a theft of
services statute in Kentucky similar to the 1966 telephone statute. 00
Such a statute has been suggested as statute 1425 of Chapter 14 of
the proposed Kentucky code.
Glen S. Bagby
03 See J. HALL, THEFr, L w AM SocrErY 155-232 (2d ed. 1952).
104 See Stumberg, Criminal Appropriation of Movables-A Need for Legis-
lative Reform, 19 TEXAS L. REv. 300, 318 (1941).
'0 5 PRESmENTS COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISRATION
OF JusTInCE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 19 (1967).
106 KRS § 434.510(2) (1966). Theft of services was traditionally outside the
scope of the theft offenses. The scope of new statutes covering theft of services
includes public services (as telephone), transportation, professional services, ad-
mission to exhibitions, use of equipment, "labor" and accommodations in hotels
and restaurants.
Where compensation for service is ordinarily paid immediately upon the
rendering of such service ... refusal to pay or absconding without pay-
ment or offer to pay gives rise to a presumption that the service was ob-
tained by deception as to intention to pay. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.7
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
